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The first shock came when Rubens Barrichello crashed
during the opening qualifying session at Imola. He lost
control of his Jordan coming trough the last chicane,
probably at around 140 mph, and didn't have time to
correct the car. He shot over a kerb, which launched
him into the air and then sent the Jordan barrel- rolling
along the tyre barrier.
What shook us most was the rate at which the car took
off; at one stage it looked as if it was going to smash
trough the fence and fly into the grandstand. The Jordan,
more by luck than anything else, finished on its side,
upside down and against the barrier. That was bad enough
but the marshals promptly tipped the car over and, as
it crashed on to its bottom, yon could see Barrichello's
head thrashing around in the cockpit.
I was astonished that the marshals should have done
that, particularly in view of the neck and spinal injuries
received by J.J. Lehto and Jean Alesi during test sessions
earlier in the year. After an accident like that, Barrichello
could have sustained similar injuries. He should have
been left as he was or, if there was a risk of fire,
then at least the car should have been put down gently.
The next day, Rubens was walking around the paddock
with nothing more than a cut lip and a broken nose.
He was talking about making a come-back at the next
race. The incident, despite its worrying implications,
was gradually forgotten as Grand Prix racing got back
down to business. In our case, that meant continuing
our efforts to improve the Williams FWl6.
Despite having tested at Nogaro in the south-west of
France during the days leading up to Imola, we were
still concerned about FWl6. There had been a certain
amount of educated guesswork and, while everyone tried
to be optimistic, Ayrton and I were sceptical; we couldn't
honestly say that the car was going to be any better
than it had been.
The problem was, in essence, two-fold. First, the car
was not consistently quicker than the Benetton and,
second, it felt horrible to drive. It is arguable as
to which of the two problems made Ayrton and myself
unhappier, but it was most probably the former.
We were always changing the set-up of the car in an
attempt to find that perfect combination which would
turn the promise of a great car into a reality. What
we wanted from the FWl6 was a feeling of balance and
drive-ability. These are the conditions which enable
a driver to enjoy the experience of driving and, consequently,
go faster. It is difficult to become familiar with a
car if it is constantly being changed in an attempt
to get good performance - it becomes a visions circle.
Ayrton, however, had enormous reserves of ability and
could overcome deficiencies in a chassis. Also, it is
more common to have a car which is difficult than one
which is perfect. So, in some ways, things were as they
should have been at Imola.
It was a pleasant surprise to find on the first day
of practice that things had improved slightly. I was
looking forward to really making some progress with
the car even though I had one or two nerve-racking moments
when I had to take to the grass because of a difficulty
with the brakes. Patrick Head pointed out that, if there
was a way of doing things wrong, and then I appeared
to be doing it! I was suitably chastened by his dressing
down although I felt better at the end of the day when
it was discovered that there had indeed been a problem
with my car. I had gone off at the final corner and
damaged the suspension. By the time repairs had been
carried out, there were just ten minutes of the first
qualifying session remaining and I only managed seventh
place on the provisional grid. Even so, I still felt
good about the Williams although I can't honestly say
that Ayrton shared my optimism; he was not convinced
we were going in the right direction. In other words,
he didn't like certain aspects of the car's behaviour.
But then he was a perfectionist.
A lot of thought was put into the set-up and, on Saturday,
the car really was much better. On my first quick laps
during qualifying, I managed to pull myself up to fourth
place. It had been a decent run and I was on my way
in when I came across warning flags at the end of the
200 mph straight. I got to Tosa corner, only to be confronted
by the remains of Roland Ratzenberger's Simtek. I could
see where the debris had started and, judging by the
distance travelled, it was obvious that this had been
a very big accident. As I went by, I had a strong sense
of foreboding about his condition because there was
so much destruction. With Barrichello we had been lucky.
This time it was very clear that poor Roland was not
going to be let off so lightly. And, unbeknown to everyone,
this was to be the start of a terrible sequence of events
which would demonstrate in no uncertain terms the inherent
dangers of the sport.
Practice was stopped. Ayrton went down to the site
of the accident because he wanted to see for himself
what had happened. He had done it before when Martin
Dounelly crashed at Jerez in 1990 and I believe it is
every driver's right to do that sort of thing if they
wish. Personally, I would rather not. I had been present
at Goodwood during a Formula Three test session in February
1986 when Bertrand Fabi was killed and I had no wish
to see anything like that again. Anyway, Ayrton chose
to go to Tosa. Everyone was terribly concerned for Roland;
the feeling was that he was in a bad way. When Ayrton
returned, he spoke to Patrick and me in private at the
side of the motor home. He said quite simply that Roland
was dead. It was his way of getting the point across
to us as deliberately as possible that from what he
had witnessed there was no doubt about it. Then he went
into the motor home and changed out of his driving overalls
even though the session was about to re-start.
I could not decide what the right thing to do should
be; stop like Ayrton or soldier on? I wished the officials
had cancelled the rest of the session so as to remove
that particular dilemma. It had been left to me to decide
whether or not I wished to go out again. You are immediately
confronted with the question, `Do I get back into a
racing car now - tomorrow - a week later - or never
again?' Just how do you decide?
It's not as if racing drivers don't know that fatal
accidents are a possibility. If a driver does not accept
that fact, if he is completely and utterly shocked by
an accident like Ratzenberger's, so much so that he
cannot get back in a racing car, then he has been deluding
himself about the danger up until that point.
Of course, racing drivers are not that stupid. But,
when confronted with something like this, you are facing
a severe and immediate test of whether or not you are
prepared to accept the risk. Roland had said he was
never as happy as when he got his Formula One drive.
It's what he wanted to do. It's what a lot of people
want to do and many never get the opportunity. Even
so, that does not make situations such as this any easier
to accept.
Everyone was deeply affected by Roland's death. Williams
and Benetton withdrew for the rest of the afternoon;
others decided to continue with the session. But the
question everyone was asking was, `Why did Roland die?'
There was concern that we had got to the point where
the inherent risks in Formula One had become greater
because of certain factors such as the speed of the
cars and their increasing ability to withstand impacts.
Something has to give and, in the light of recent accidents,
it was turning out to be the driver. Had we reached
the totally unacceptable stage where, if a car was going
to hit a wall then the driver was going to die? Ironically,
in the light of what would happen the following day,
Ayrton went to talk with other drivers and people such
as Niki Lauda, who had been involved in a horrific accident
in 1976. They wanted to know what could be done - and
done immediately - about safety. It was agreed that
the drivers should meet and discuss these matters, probably
at Monaco in two weeks' time.
The mood that night was sombre to say the least. I
stayed at the circuit, ate at the motor home and generally
found it difficult to think of much else but the accident.
I tried to concentrate hard on what we were going to
do for the race. My thoughts were, `Look, I'm not going
to stop racing; I'm looking forward to the Grand Prix.
I enjoy my motor racing just as Roland did. Every second
you are alive, you've got to be thankful and derive
as much pleasure from it as you can.' In some ways,
events that afternoon had been a spur, a reminder not
to become complacent. It prompted me to be as positive
as I could, look forward to the race and pray that something
could be done to prevent such things happening again.
It was to be a short-lived hope.
When the cars went out for the warm-up on race morning,
it was the first time I had been on the circuit since
knowing the outcome of Roland's accident. It was terrifying
to go past the point where he had crashed. You could
suddenly imagine the force of the impact because you
were actually travelling at the same speed he had been
doing before he went off.
Under normal circumstances, you wouldn't give it a second
thought because, even though speeds reach 200 mph, it
is not a part of the circuit where you come close to
the limit; it is not a place you would worry about.
You are relying entirely on the car and, in the light
of Roland's accident (probably caused by a failure of
the nose wing mounting), it brings it home that sometimes
you are just a passenger, putting your faith in the
components.
Drivers can accept the penalty of making a mistake;
there is always the hope that they can do something
about retrieving the situation and that the penalty
is not too severe. At least it's their mistake. However,
it feels very uncomfortable placing all your trust in
the machinery - but there is no alternative. It is rather
like being on an aeroplane; you are at the mercy of
the pilot and the integrity of the equipment. You are
powerless to do anything about your situation. At least
I had the consolation of driving for Williams Grand
Prix Engineering. I knew they would always do the best
job possible.
I knew, too, that Ayrton was out to dominate proceedings
on race day. He had been fastest during the warm-up
and I was next, 9/l0ths of a second slower. I was happy
with the car and I knew exactly what I'd had to do to
set that time. So it was clear that Ayrton must have
tried very hard indeed to set his time. It seemed to
me that my team-mate was playing a psychological game
here because, when you know that someone is almost a
second a lap faster, it can demoralize you before the
race has even started. I was not too worried because
I was happy with the pace I was running at; I knew I
could keep that up throughout the race whereas I didn't
think Ayrton could. It was going to be a very interesting
race.
All of this kept my mind focused on the job but, when
we went to the pre-race drivers' briefing, the previous
day's tragedy proved to be just beneath the surface
of everyone's consciousness. There was a minute's silence
for Roland and the atmosphere was heavy with more than
the usual pre-race tension. The talk of a drivers' meeting
about safety to take place before Monaco rang alarm
bells with the Formula One organizers. Whenever drivers
group together there is the potential for trouble. Well,
we were all together now, in the pre-race drivers' briefing
as usual, and we weren't happy.
But there was very little that could actually be achieved
right then. Gerhard Berger raised one seemingly insignificant
but relevant point about safety. But what he did not
reveal was that he had put up to it by Senna. Ayrton
didn't want to be the first to raise the point for fear
of appearing to be the only person concerned about the
problem, yet; typically, it was he who pressed it home.
One of the things which had upset Ayrton in Japan had
been the introduction of a pace car during the final
parade lap leading to the start. He felt that it was
nothing more than a gimmick and contributed nothing
else than making the cars run far too slowly and therefore
less able to put heat into their tyres. When other drivers
backed him up, the officials agreed without hesitation
to abandon that idea. A small victory had been won,
but it was nonetheless significant.
This was evidence of a failure to consult the drivers
on important issues. There are certain matters which
only the drivers are qualified to comment on this strengthened
the view that we should get together and express our
fears in an attempt to have things changed and make
the racing a little bit safer.
As the race approached, I'm sure most drivers were
able to put those thoughts to the back of their minds.
I think everyone felt -as they had done for the previous
twelve years- that the dangers had been reduced considerably,
to the point where death was but a slim possibility.
And, in the aftermath, it was felt that Roland's crash
had been one accident in a decade and it was unlikely
to happen again for a while. You could claim that it
is stupid to act like that. But that's the way people
think.
In any case, I'm sure Ayrton had other things to occupy
him at this stage. Pressure had been coming from all
directions. The media had been making a point about
how the winner at Imola nearly always goes on to take
the championship; that Ayrton had failed to score a
single point in the first two races (something he had
never experienced before in his ten years in Formula
One); that Michael Schumacher was the coming man and
had a twenty-point lead over Ayrton; that this was a
crucial race because Schumacher and Benetton were favourites
to win the next round at Monaco. I think all of that
had impressed itself upon Ayrton. The warm-up had shown
he was in a fighting mood. He had pole position and
he was raring to turn the tide.
Some people have attempted to infer that Ayrton was
not in the right frame of mind for the race, but I cannot
say anything more than that, to me, he seemed tota11y
focused. It must have been difficult completely to ignore
the events of the day before, even for a man such as
Ayrton, but when a race is about to start your mind
can be on one thing only - winning.
Sure enough, he made a good start but we only got as
far as the Acque Minerali chicane at the top of the
circuit when the red flags came out and there were signs
that the safety car was being brought into play. The
safety car had been a fairly recent innovation, a means
of slowing the cars as it formed behind an official
car and circulated at reduced pace until whatever problem
on the track had been sorted out. In this case, when
we got to the start/finish area, we could see there
had been a collision.
J.J. Lehto, starting from the second row, had stalled
and had been hit from behind by Pedro Lamy who had performed
some sort of extraordinary manoeuvre from the penultimate
row and crashed into the back of the Benetton. I had
been warned on the radio that there was a lot of wreckage
on the track but I was not aware that a wheel and parts
of a car had cleared the fence and gone into the enclosure,
injuring a number of spectators. There was debris everywhere
and it was difficult to avoid it, which was a worry.
The aim of the safety car is to keep the show going
without bringing the race to a complete halt. But my
feeling was that this should only have applied during
a race once it was up and running. In this case, we
hadn't even done a fill lap at racing speed and it was
difficult to see why the race could not have been stopped
and re-started, as permitted by the rules. The net result
was that we were forced to go round at what can only
be described as a snail's pace for five laps. Anyone
who has worked with Ayrton will tell you how much time
and effort he put in to making sure his tyre pressures
were absolutely right. I'm not exaggerating when I say
that he could tell, to within half a pound psi, whether
the car was balanced or not. This is a critical area
because every racing car is sensitive to tyre pressures.
While we wait on the grid during the final fifteen minutes
or so, the tyres are wrapped in electric warmers and
these ensure that the temperatures are maintained, even
during the minute or so after the blankets have been
removed and we wait for the green flag.
But the problem is that, during the subsequent parade
lap, the pressures and temperatures drop due to the
fact that you are not running quickly enough to generate
sufficient heat in the rubber.
And, as Ayrton had pointed out, this business of running
the Porsche pace car in Japan only made matters worse.
During the first few laps of the race, therefore, the
car does not handle particularly well until the heat
gets back into the tyres and the pressures come up.
And at Imola, the problem was compounded when we had
to do five laps behind the safety car. Certainly, my
car was more difficult to drive than usual during those
first few laps after the re-start.
To be honest, I hadn't helped matters by messing up
the re-start slightly when the safety car pulled off.
So it happened that, on the two occasions when the safety
car had been used in the past, I had been leading. The
trick is to drop back and give yourself a free run once
the car disappears but, when you are in traffic, as
I was at Imola, it is not possible to see exactly where
the safety car is. It is best to stick with the guys
in front but, in this instance, I had dropped back too
much and, when Ayrton and Michael took off at the re-start,
I was already about five seconds behind.
But I had learned an important lesson. At Imola, there
is a tight chicane just before the start/finish straight.
When I slowed for the chicane, the brakes and the tyres
were cold. I locked up my left-front wheel and, for
a terrible moment, I thought I was going to slide off
the road before I had even started the first flying
lap. That alerted me to the problem caused by the five
slow laps behind the official car.
I spent the first lap trying to cope with the car and
concentrating on catching Gerhard Berger's Ferrari ahead
of me in third place. I could see up ahead that Ayrton
was leading Michael and they were quite close. There
is no question that Ayrton was highly motivated to beat
Michael and I'm sure he was finding it frustrating not
to be pulling away during those first few laps.
When I came through Tamburello for the second time,
there was dust and debris and a car going sideways across
the grass. I could see that it was Ayrton. At the time,
I was busy dodging wheels and a nose wing that was flying
through the air. I was pretty occupied as I went by
but, once I'd got past the scene of the accident, I
was concerned for Ayrton's safety. It had obviously
been a very big shunt; you don't have a small one on
that corner. My initial thoughts were that Ayrton and
Michael had tangled and one of them had been pushed
off.
The race had been stopped and we pulled up at the pit
lane entrance. Everyone was asking about what had happened
but we had no information. One report suggested Ayrton
had been moving. Then they said he was out of the car.
But, either way, it was very possible that he was seriously
hurt.
I was anxious to find out precisely what had taken place.
And why. I went over to Michael Schurnacher and asked
him what he had seen. He explained that Ayrton's car
had been bottoming a lot and he'd almost lost it at
Tamburello on the previous lap. In his opinion, the
same thing had happened again but, this time, Ayrton
didn't catch it and went off. I asked Michael if he
had seen any hint of trouble, perhaps with the suspension,
or the tyres; something like that. He said he hadn't
seen any problems at all.
I took all of that on board and made a note to be careful
in the early stages when the tyre pressures might be
low and perhaps the car is bottoming too much. But I
still knew nothing about Ayrton's condition. It is one
of the less savoury aspects of motor racing that it
is not considered to be a good idea to tell the whole
truth at the time of an accident in order to get the
show over with and send people home none the wiser.
Slowly, however, word trickled through that Ayrton's
condition was quite serious.
I just couldn't believe that this was happening. I thought
that perhaps he'd hurt himself badly and he would be
out for a couple of races. That was as much as I knew;
that was as much as I would allow myself to think. I
tried to concentrate on the race and motivate myself
with the thought that it was very important that I get
a result for the team. There was nothing I could do
about Ayrton. The only thing was to do my job to the
best of my ability.
Despite making a reasonable start, that plan was wrecked
half-way round the first lap as I tried to take second
place off Schurnacher. He was trying to get past Gerhard
Berger and I don't think he realized I was so close.
The Benetton chopped straight across in front of me
and accidentally took a nose wing off. That meant a
pit stop for a replacement and the task of rejoining
at the back of the field. It sounds callous, perhaps,
but my thoughts were either, `Things just aren't going
our way this year', or `My God, this just gets worse
Throughout the race, I just kept thinking that this
was a job which had to be done.
Nothing more than that. Much as I felt like it, there
was no way I was going to pull in because that would
have been completely the wrong thing to do. The only
answer was to try to better the situation the team found
themselves in and get the best result I could. Looking
at it coldly, it was what I was paid to do and that
was about as much enjoyment as I got out of it. One
point for sixth place was hardly brilliant. It was something
after a climb from last place - but what value was that
in the context of everything which had happened over
the weekend?
I was pretty shattered by the end of the race. I spoke
to Frank and he explained that Ayrton was not in good
shape. I just wanted to get away from the circuit; just
get in the car and go. Georgie and I could have had
a lift in the helicopter if we wanted to wait. But I
just wanted to leave as soon as possible.
We did that, even though it meant sitting in a traffic
jam for ages. We missed our first flight but I was only
worried about how Ayrton was going to pull through all
of this. When we reached the airport a member of the
team was waiting to tell us that Ayrton was dead.
I had briefly considered that as a possibility but put
the thought out of my mind by reflecting on what I had
learned about his condition. I had been told that he
had serious head injuries and it seemed likely to me
that he might never drive again. But that's about as
far as my thinking had gone. To learn that he was dead
was like having someone turn off your power supply.
I was completely shaken; totally shattered.
Georgie and I drove off and stopped at a restaurant
where we sat down to think about it all. And you ask
yourself over and over again, `Is it worth it?' That's
the bottom line at the end of a weekend like this; always
the same question, `Is it worth it?'
It was not a new sensation for me. I can remember playing
in the front room at home when the newsflash came through
that Jim Clark had been killed. I knew that he was my
Dad's friend and, when my Mum came into the room, I
could see she was shocked. I didn't really understand
what had happened. But I knew it was bad.
Throughout that period of my life there were occasions
when my father had to go to the funerals of friends.
It was, without wishing to sound macabre, a gradual
introduction to the reality of motor sport, admittedly
at a time when the safety standards were nothing like
they are now. I remember thinking, `Hang on, why Dad
is doing this? It doesn't make sense.'
And yet he carried on. He did not give up because of
the accidents and he drove through what was probably
one of the most dangerous periods of Grand Prix racing.
The irony was, of course, that he did not actually die
in a racing car. And that itself was something which
I had to cope with. He raced cars, faced the obvious
dangers and yet he died in an aeroplane. Where was the
logic in that? It was part of the learning process where
I discovered that bad things happen in life, even if
you don't put yourself at risk. Horrible things occur
all the time. To me, it seems the real tragedy would
be to stop doing something you enjoy. There is no reward
without risk. James Hunt died of a heart attack and
yet who is to say that he did not live more, cram more
into his forty-six years than most people manage in
a lifetime? I don't pretend to know the answer.
Probably the easiest thing is to do is carry on and
convince yourself that you're doing the right thing.
So I forced myself as much as possible to think about
giving up and doing something else. Nothing definite
sprang to mind but I knew I could do all the things
which I had been forced to abandon for the sake of motor
racing; weekends off, skiing, more time with the children,
see my friends more often; that sort of thing.
And yet I knew that, since an early age, I had always
wanted to challenge myself I needed those punctuations
in my life where I had to face up to a severe test and
the fact is that few things can offer that sort of opportunity.
There are times when I feel totally happy with myself
It may not last long. It might be for a few hours, it
could even be for a fill day but, quite often, it is
only a matter of minutes after I've done something that
I'm really proud of. But those moments are addictive.
Once you've had one, you need them again and again,
like hitting a good golf shot. You subconsciously think
of the time when you've had enough (maybe after the
highest high) and will give up, completely fulfilled.
Until then, you continue to risk all for that fleeting
moment.
It may be different for other drivers. In fact, I can't
begin to know how people such as Philippe Streiff and
Martin Dounelly, put out of racing through serious injury,
must feel. How much would they give to get back into
a racing car? Or are they simply happy to be alive?
It is not the sort of question you can put to them but
it is something you need to ask yourself.
There was almost too much time to think about everything
during the days which followed. I deliberately chose
not to watch television or look at newspapers the following
day. I did not see the video of the accident until Tuesday,
by which time I had decided that I really ought to find
out what had happened. Then I learned that Ayrton's
funeral would take place in Sao Paulo.
The last thing I wanted at that point was to go to Brazil;
given the choice, I would have gone away with my family
and cut myself off until it was all over. I was not
a close friend of Ayrton because I had only really known
him for a few months. But the fact was that I had to
face certain things: I had to find how and why Ayrton
had crashed and it was important to show my loyalty
as his team- mate. I knew I had to go to the funeral.
I'm glad now that I did. I discovered just how much
Ayrton meant to Brazil. The funeral was almost presidential;
quite extraordinary. Thousands of people lined the streets
and many ran alongside the cortege. It was a very long
way and I saw one person run almost the fill distance
before falling into a hedge with exhaustion. There was
a twenty-one-gun salute carried out with great military
precision, a fly-past, a number of dignitaries, including
the president of Argentina and the Japanese ambassador.
Ayrton's family had requested that the drivers present
escort the coffin as far as they could to the graveside,
where there was a rifle salute. Overhead were four or
five helicopters; it was a television spectacular of
sorts but I couldn't hear any of the service because
of the racket from above. I thought it rather sad that
the family couldn't be left in peace during those final
minutes.
The furore over why he crashed was still raging in the
media but, even though I was a member of the team, I
was not aware of any animosity. In fact, it seemed to
me quite the opposite. I was touched, particularly by
the children who would have grown up knowing nothing
but the success which Ayrton Senna brought to Brazil.
It was obviously very difficult for them to understand
what had happened to their hero.
I remember being approached for my autograph by two
fans as I left the hotel to go to the funeral. They
said that Brazil would be watching me now - and that
just choked me with emotion. I suddenly realized that
they loved motor racing and, because Ayrton had chosen
Williams as his team, it had become their team as well.
It was not that I was stepping into his Ayrton's shoes
or anything like that; it was just that Williams had
become a part of their life and, by association; I was
a part of it too. I thought it was a truly generous
thing for them to say. All this was a lot for me to
take on board. I had been looking forward to racing
under the protective umbrella of Ayrton Senna. If I
came second to him in a race then I could say I had
done a good job - provided he wasn't too far ahead.
But suddenly I was discovering the kind of responsibility
he had been carrying all these years. He had been expected
to win all the time. Being this person Ayrton Senna
must have been a burden even if he did choose to carry
it in the first place. In the short time that we had
worked together, I had come to understand that he was
a pretty special driver, an instinctive driver. If you
gave him a car which wasn't quite perfect, he could
still make it go very quickly; in fact, I don't think
he knew any other way.
I remember being intrigued by the way he would describe
how the car handled. He would put his hands up in front
of his face as if he was looking through the steering
wheel, almost as if he was aiming the car. He had a
very, very good ability to recall sensations and talk
about the car repeatedly so that the engineer understood
exactly what he was trying to say. It was in abstract
terms. He wouldn't say the roll bar was too stiff. He
would talk about sensations; refer to the road doing
this or such and such a corner doing that, things I
didn't even consider. He seemed to be able to see in
minute detail exactly how the road changed.
If a car was not capable of winning, Ayrton could make
it win. In the Brazilian Grand Prix, for instance, he
had a car which was a bit off the pace of Schurnacher's
Benetton. Yet he was able to stay with Michael and I
was astounded that he had been able to do that with
a car which, if it was anything like mine, simply wasn't
handling.
At one stage they were about to lap me. Michael came
through and I thought I had better get out of Ayrton's
way. But, almost before I had taken the decision, he
dived past me and nearly went off. He was heading towards
the grass and just managed to slither through. He had
completely messed up the corner but, to him, the important
thing was to get by; he wasn't going to lose any time
hanging around waiting for me.
It was as if he was being sucked towards the end of
the race; as if you had attached one end of an elastic
band to the start line and wound the rest up for the
number of laps - and then just let him go. His desire
to win was simply overwhelming. And judging by the remarkable
scenes at his funeral, he was doing it for a nation
he loved, a nation which loved him.
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